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Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial 
Communication 
Robert F. Forston* 
The Anglo-American jury is a remarkable political institu- 
tion . . . [which] represents a deep commitment to the use of 
laymen in the administration of justice. . . . It opposes the 
cadre of professional, experienced judges with this transient, 
ever-changing, ever-inexperienced group of amateurs. The jury 
is thus by definition an exciting experiment in the conduct of 
serious human affairs, and i t  is not surprising that, virtually 
from its inception, it has been the subject of deep controversy, 
attracting a t  once the most extravagant praise and the most 
harsh criticism.' 
For centuries jurists and scholars have debated the advan- 
tages and disadvantages of the jury system, the competence or 
incompetence of jurors as fact-finders and appliers of the law, and 
the uniformity or capriciousness of the "justice" that results from 
the ~ y s t e m . ~  Recently the number of empirical studies on the jury 
system has been growing rapidly. Inquiries have been made into 
the competence of  juror^,^ the selection and management of ju- 
*Associate Professor of Speech Communication, Chairman of the Department of 
Speech Communication, Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa. B.A., 1963, M.A., 1966, 
Ph.D., 1968, University of Minnesota. Commissioner, Iowa Supreme Court Commission 
on Continuing Legal Education. 
1. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 3, 4 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 
KALVEN & ZEISEL]. 
2. Id. a t  7-9. The following is a short bibliographical sampling of the controversy: 
DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JUDGE 164 (1956); J .  FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 148 (1935); L. 
GREEN, JUDGES AND JURY (1930); E. LIVINGSTON, SYSTEMS OF PENAL AW FOR THE STATE OF 
LOUISIANA AND FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 10 (1873); G. WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF 
GUILT (3d. ed. 1963); Hearing Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Adm'n of the 
Internal Security Act of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 
(1955); Benson, Can Our Judicial System Be Improved by the Elimination of Civil Jury 
Trials, 15 FED'N INS. COUN. Q. 18 (1965); Brass, Should Jury Trails be Abolished in Civil 
Cases? 37 N.Y.S.B.J. 157 (1965); Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, 5 VAND. L. REV. 
150 (1952); Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055 (1964); Pound, Law 
in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910); Sunderland, Verdicts, General and 
Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253 (1920); Wigmore, A Program on the Trial of a Jury Trial, 12 J. 
AM. JUD. SOC'Y 166 (1929); Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1952); Comment, Abolition of the Civil Jury: Proposed Alternative, 
15 DEPAUL . REV. 416 (1966). 
3. E.g., Dashiel, Experimental Studies of the Influence of Social Situations, in 
HANDBOOK F SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1097 (G. Murchinson ed. 1935); KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra 
note 1; R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY (1967) [hereinafter cited as 
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r ~ r s , ~  the effects of videotape on  juror^,^ how foremen are chosen,' 
jury decision-making  dynamic^,^ juror bias caused by sex, 
SIMON]; Erlanger, Jury Research in America: Its Past and Future, 4 L. & SOC'Y REV. 345 
(1970); Hoffman & Brodley, Jurors on Trial, 17 Mo. L. REV. 235 (1952); James, Status 
and Competence of Jurors, 64 AM. J .  SOC. 563 (1959) [hereinafter cited as James]; 
Marston, Studies in Testimony, 15 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 1 (1924); Redmont, Psychological 
Tests for Selecting Jurors, 5 U. KAN. L. REV. 391 (1957); Summers, A Comparative Study 
of the Qualifications of State and Federal Jurors, 34 WIS. B. BULL. 35 (Oct. 1961); Note, 
Psychological Tests and Standards of Competence for Selecting Jurors, 65 YALE L.J. 531 
(1956). 
4. E.g., Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (1970); Edling, 
Obtaining Jurors, 1 TEX. L. & LEG. 68 (1947); Lasdon, Waren & Madson, Juror Manage- 
ment in a Metropolitan Court, 57 JUDICATURE 402 (1974); Plutchik & Schwartz, Jury 
Selection: Folklore or Science?, 1 CRIM. L. BULL. NO. 4 a t  3 (1965); Vanderzell, The Jury 
as a Community Cross-Section, 19 W. POL. Q. 136 (1966); Wildman, Selection and Exami- 
nation of Jurors, 5 DEPAUL . REV. 32 (1955); Comment, Class Discrimination in Selection 
of Jurors, 5 CATH. U.L. REV. 157 (1955); Comment, Jury-Pretrial Selection-Suggested 
Improvements, 56 MICH. L. REV. 954 (1958); Note, The Congress, the Court and Jury 
Selection, 52 VA. L. REV. 1069 (1966); Note, Fair Jury Selection Procedures, 75 YALE L.J. 
322 (1965). 
5. E.g., Miller & Siebert, Effects of Video Taped Testimony on Information Process- 
ing and Decision-Making Jury Trials, N.S.F. Progress Rep. 1 (March 1974); R. Forston, 
Courtroom Access-T.V.: Clarification and Recommendations, Nov. 1972 (paper pre- 
sented to the Western Speech Comm. Ass'n Conv., Honolulu); G. Miller, D. Bender, T. 
Florence & H. Nicholson, Communication Variables in the Judicial Process, Dec. 1972 
(paper presented before the Speech Comm. Ass'n Conv.); Miller, Bender, Florence & 
Nicholson, Real Versus Reel: What's the Verdict?, 24 J. COMM. 99 (Summer 1974); Miller, 
Televised Trials; How Do Juries React?, 58 JUDICATURE 242 (1974); Symposium: The Use 
of Videotape in the Courtroom, 1975 B.Y.U.L. REV. 327; T. V. Cameras Used in Michigan 
Court, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1971, a t  24, col. 1; Use of Videotape Growing in Courtroom, 
Chi. Tribune, July 18, 1974, § 4a, a t  3, col. 1. 
6. E.g., R. Forston, The Foreman Myth, Apr. 1974 (paper presented to the Central 
States Speech Ass'n Conv., Milwaukee); R. Gordon, A Study in Forensic Psychology: 
Petit Jury Verdicts as a Function of the Number of Jury Members, 1968 (doctoral disserta- 
tion, University of Oklahoma) [hereinafter cited as Gordon]; C. Hawkins, Interaction 
and Coalition Realignments in Consensus-Seeking Groups: A Study of Experimental Jury 
Deliberation, 1960 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago) [hereinafter 
cited as Hawkins]; Bevan, Aldert, Loiseaux, Mayfield & Wright, Jury Behavior as a 
Function of the Prestige of the Foreman and the Nature of His Leadership, 7 J. PUB. L. 
419 (1958). 
7. T.  Baker, A Dimension of Source Credibility Which Affects Jury Decision-Making 
in Personal Injury Cases, 1968 (unpublished masters thesis, Northern Illinois University); 
R. Fortson, Communication Process: A Method for Improving Judge-Lawyer-Juror Com- 
munication, Dec. 1974 (paper presented to the Speech Comm. Ass'n Conv., Chicago); R. 
Forston, The Decision-Making Process in the American Civil Jury: A Comparative Metho- 
dological Investigation, 1968 (doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota) [hereinafter 
cited as Forston (1968)]; R. Forston, How the Jury Decides, (Continuing Legal Educ. 
Center, Drake Univ. 1970); Hawkins, supra note 6; J. Kessler, Techniques of Jury Re- 
search, Apr. 1974 (paper presented to Central States Speech Ass'n Conv., Chicago); Luck, 
Trial Jury Decision-Making Research: A Synthesis and Critique, 1970 (masters thesis, 
University of Georgia) [hereinafter cited as Luck]; Broeder, The Importance of the 
Scapegoat in Jury Trial Cases: Some Preliminary Reflections, 4 DUQUESNE L. REV. 513 
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personality, and a t t r a c t i ~ n , ~  majority jury  verdict^,^ the import- 
(1966); Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 158 (1958); Kessler, The Social Psychology of Jury Deliberations, The Jury System 
in America: A Critical Overview, 4 SAGE CRIM. JUSTICE SYS. ANNUALS 67 (1975); Kline & 
Jess, Prejudicial Publicity: Its Effect on Law School Mock Juries, 43 JOURNALISM Q. 113 
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Kline & Jess]; Landy & Aronson, The Influence of the Char- 
acter of the Criminal and His Victim on the Jury Decisions of Simulated Jurors, 5 J .  EXP. 
Soc. PSYCH. 141 (1969); Simon & Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A View from the 
Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 L. & SOC'Y REV. 319 (1971); Simon & Marshall, 
The Jury System, 1 SAGE CRIM. JUSTICE SYS. ANNUALS 211 (1972); Strodtbeck & Hook, The 
Social Dimensions of a Twelve-Man Jury Table, 24 SOCIOMETRY 397 (1961); Strodtbeck, 
James & Hawkins, Social Status in Jury Deliberations, 22 AM. Soc. REV. 713 (1957); 
Vidmar, Effects of Decision Alternatives on the Verdicts and Social Perceptions of Simu- 
lated Jurors, 22 J .  PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH. 211 (1972); Weld & Danzig, A Study of the Way 
in Which a Verdict is Reached by a Jury, 53 AM. J .  PSYCH. 518 (1940) [hereinafter cited 
as Weld & Danzig]; Weld & Roff, A Study in the Formation of Opinion Based Upon Legal 
Evidence, 51 AM. J. PSYCH. 609 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Weld & Roa; Winter, The 
Jury and the Risk of Nonpersuasion, 5 L. & SOC'Y REV. 335 (1971); Zeisel, Reflections on 
Experimental Techniques in the Law, 2 J .  LEGAL STUDIES 107 (1973); Zeisel, What Deter- 
mines the Amount of Argument Per Juror?, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 279 (1963); Margulies, 
Defendants Aren't Always Innocent: T. V. 'Convicts' the Prosecution, Salt Lake Tribune, 
March 16, 1975, 4 H, a t  9, col. 1. 
8. E.g., R. Kukla & J. Kessler, The Influence of Physical Attractiveness on Decisions 
of Simulated Jurors, Nov. 1973 (paper presented to the Speech Comm. Ass'n Conv., New 
York); C. Stephan, Sex Prejudice in Jury Simulation, 1973 (paper presented at the Am. 
Soc. Ass'n Conv., New York); C. Stephan & J .  Tully, The Influence of Physical Attractive- 
ness of a Plaintiff on the Decisions of Simulated Juries, 1973 (paper presented at No. 
Central Soc. Ass'n Conv., Cincinnati); G. White, Sex Bias in Experimental Juries, 1970 
(doctoral dissertation, University of Maryland); Becker, Hildrum & Bateman, The Influ- 
ence of Jurors' Values on Their Verdicts: A Courts and Politics Experiment, 46 SW. SOC. 
SCI. Q. 130 (1965); Broeder, Occupational Expertise and Bias as Affecting Juror Behavior: 
A Preliminary Look, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1079 (1965); Broeder, Plaintiff$ Family Status as 
Affecting Juror Behavior: Some Tentative Insights, 14 J .  PUB. L. 131 (1965); Broeder, 
Previous Jury Trial Service Affecting Juror Behavior, 506 INS. L.J. 138 (1965); Wend & 
Vinson, Leaning Over Backwards: Juror's Responses to Defendant's Attractiveness, 24 J .  
COMMUNICATIONS 124 ( ummer 1974); Hartshome, Jury Verdicts: A Study of Their Char- 
acteristics and Trends, 35 A.B.A.J. 113 (1949); Hermann, Occupations of Jurors as an 
Influence on Their Verdict, 5 FORUM 150 (1970); Mitchell & Byme, The Defendant's 
Dilemma: Effects of Juror's Attitudes and Authoritarianism on Judicial Decisions, 25 J. 
PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH. 123 (1973); Nagel & Weitzman, Sex and the Unbiased Jury, 78 
CASE & COM. 28 (Mar.-Apr. 1973); Reed, Jury Deliberations, Voting, and Verdict Trends, 
45 Sw. Soc. SCI. Q. 361 (1965); Robinson, Bias, Probability and Trial by Jury, 15 AM. SOC. 
REV. 73 (1950); Stephan, Selective Characteristics of Jurors and Litigants: Their Influ- 
ences on Jurys' Verdicts, The Jury System: A Critical Overview, 4 SAGE CRIM. JUSTICE SYS. 
ANNUALS 95 (1975). 
9. E.g., A. Padawer-Singer, Less Than Unanimous vs. Unanimous Jury Verdicts, 
Dec. 1974 (paper presented to the Speech Comm. Ass'n Conv., Chicago); Barrow, 
Conflicts in Jury Findings, 26 TEXAS B.J. 23 (1963); Boone & Potts, Majority Verdicts for 
Texas?, 6 TEXAS B.J. 118 (1943); Bouchelle, Requirement of Consent of Three-Fourths of 
Jury to Verdicts in Civil Actions, Abolishing Law of Unanimous Consent, 48 J. AM. JUD. 
SOC'Y 69 (1947); Ginsberg, Special Findings and Jury Unanimity in the Federal Courts, 
65 COLUM. L. REV. 256 (1965); Haralson, Unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases, 21 
MISS. L. J. 185 (1950); Haralson, Why Veto Jury Verdicts?, 31 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y (1947); 
Icenogle, The Menace of the 'Hung Jury', 47 A.B.A.J. 280 (1961); Kun, Validity of Uanani- 
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ance of jury instructions to the jury,1° jury size,ll and the import- 
mous Verdict Requirements, 22 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 15 (1950); Weinstein, Trial by Jury and 
Unanimous Verdicts, 69 U.S.L. REV. 513 (1935); Winters, Majority Verdicts in the United 
States, 26 J .  AM. JUD. SOC'Y 87 (1942); Comment, The Case for Retention of the Unani- 
mous Civil Jury, 15 DEPAUL . REV. 403 (1966); Comment, Civil Procedure-Less Than 
Unanimous Jury Verdicts, 27 N.C.L. REV. 539 (1949); Comment, Compromise Verdicts 
in Criminal Cases, 37 NEB. L. REV. 802 (1958); 23 CALIF. L. REV. 218 (1935); 10 ST. JOHN'S 
L. REV. 373 (1936); 26 WASH. L. REV. 56 (1951); Forston, Deliberation Time for Non- 
Unanimous Verdicts, Des Moines Tribune, April 3, 1973, a t  8. 
10. E.g., R. BRANSON, THE LAW OF INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 
(1936); R. MCBRIDE, THE ART OF INSTRUCTING THE JURY (1969) [hereinafter cited as 
MCBRIDE]; F. Woleslagel, The 'Kiss' Principle of Jury Communication, July 1974 (ad- 
dress before the ABA Conv., Honolulu) [hereinafter cited as Woleslagel (1974)l; Broeder, 
The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1959); Forston, Judges' 
Instructions: A Quantitative Analysis of Jurors' Listening Comprehension, 18 TODAY'S 
SPEECH 34 (Fall 1970); Forston, Justice, Jurors, and Judges' Instructions, 12 JUDGES' J .  68 
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Forston (1973)l; Hervey, Jurors Look a t  Our Judges, 18 OKLA. 
B. ASS'N J .  1508 (1947); Hunter, Law in the Jury Room, 2 OHIO ST. U.L.J. 1 (1935) 
[hereinafter cited as Hunter]; Kline & Jess, supra note 7 a t  116; Meyer & Rosenberg, 
Questions Juries Ask: Untapped Springs of Insight, 55 JUDICATURE 105 (1971) [hereinafter 
cited as Meyer & Rosenberg]; O'Mara, The Courts, Standard Jury Charges-Findings of 
Pilot Project, 43 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 166 (1972); O'Reilly, Why Some Juries Fail, 41 D.C.B.J. 
69 (1974) [hereinafter cited as O'Reilly]; Sigworth, Arizona Uniform Jury Instructions, 
8 ARIZ. B.J. 9 (Spring 1973) [hereinafter cited as Sigworth]; Comment, Study of the 
North Carolina Jury Charge: Present Practice and Future Proposals, 6 WAKE FOREST 
INTRA. L. REV. 459 (1970) [hereinafter cited as North Carolina Jury Charge]; Comment, 
On Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 YALE L.J. 100 (1968); Forston, Does the Jury Under- 
stand?-Usually Not, Des Moines Sunday Register, May 21, 1972, § c, a t  15. 
11. E.g. ,  J. Ahern, Communication in Juries: A Study of Decision-Making in Differ- 
ent Sized Groups, Dec. 1971 (paper presented to the Speech Comm. Ass'n Conv., San 
Francisco); Gordon, supra note 6; J. Kessler, A Content Analytic Comparison of the Six 
and Twelve-Member Jury Decision-Making Processes, 1973 (doctoral dissertation, Uni- 
versity of Michigan); Augelli, Six-Member Juries in Civil Actions in the Federal Judicial 
System, 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 281 (1972); Beiser & Varrin, Six-Member Juries in the 
Federal Courts, 58 JUDICATURE 424 (1975); Bond, On Six-Person Juries, 26 B. BULL. BOSTON 
241 (1955); Cronin, Six-Member Juries in District Courts, 2 BOSTON B.J. 27 (Apr. 1958); 
Henchman, The New South Wales Jury of Four Persons, 33 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 235 (1959); 
Pabst, Statistical Studies of the Costs of Six-Man Versus Twelve-Man Juries, 14 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 326 (1972) ; Pabst, What Do Six-Mem ber Juries Really Save?, 57 JUDICATURE 
6 (1973); Phillips, A Jury of Six in All Cases, 30 CONN. B.J. 354 (1956); Pinsley, Number 
of Jurors Required, 25 ILL. B.J. 114 (1936); Tamm, The Five-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed 
Constitutional Amendment, 51 GEO. L.J. 120 (1962); Thompson, Six Will Do!, 10 TRIAL, 
Nov.-Dec. 1974, a t  12; Wiehl, The Six-Man Jury, 4 GONZAGA L. REV. 35 (1968); Zeisel, . . . 
And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 
(1971); Zeisel, Twelve is Just, 10 TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at  13 [hereinafter cited as 
Zeisel]; Zeisel & Diamond, "Convincing Empirical Evidence" on the Six-Member Jury, 
41 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (1974); Note, The Effect of Jury Size on the Probability of Convic- 
tion: An Evaluation of William u. Florida, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 529 (1971); Note, 
Constitutional Law--Jury of Less Than Twelve Men, 10 NOTRE DAME LAW. 61 (1934); 
Note, An Empirical Study of Six and Twelve Member Jury Decision-Making Processes, 6 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 712 (1973); Note, Reducing the Size of Juries, 5 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 87 (1971); Note, Six-Member and Twelve-Member Juries: An Empirical Study 
of Trial Results, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 671 (1973); 15 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 65 (1936); 10 
IND. L.J. 259 (1935); 42 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y 136 (1958). 
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ance of voir dire. l2 
Unfortunately, this voluminous criticism and research has 
done little to improve the jury system. Most of the recent research 
has been designed, not to help jurors better perform their func- 
tions nor to improve the jury system, but rather to meet certain 
administrative needs of the judicial system. The contention of 
this article is that most of the research and criticism relating to 
the jury system is therefore misdirected. Because juries are likely 
to continue as a basic element in our system of justice,13 both 
proponents and critics of the jury should be motivated to improve 
the system in order to obtain the best it has to offer. 
The facet of the jury system perhaps most in need of im- 
provement is the communication process in jury trials.14 Effective 
- 
12. Brill, Voir Dire-Examination of Jurors, 29 Mo. L. REV. 259 (1964); Broeder, Voir 
Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503 (1965); Busch, Selecting 
the Jury, 47 ILL. B.J. 238 (1958); Carr, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: An Appraisal by 
an Attorney, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 653; Crebs, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: An Appraisal 
by a Judge, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 644; Doherty, Selection of Jury in a Criminal Case, 2 ILL. 
CONT. LEGAL EDUC. 103 (1964); Eddy, Challenges to Jurors, 229 L. TIMES 305 (1960); Elam, 
Techniques of Jury Selection from Plaintiff's Viewpoint; From Defendant's Viewpoint, 
A.B.A. SEC. INS., NEG. & COMP. L. 354 (1965); Field, Voir Dire Examinations-A Ne- 
glected Art, 33 U. Mo. K.C.L. REV. 171 (1965); Fried, Kaplin & Klein, Juror Selection, 
An Analysis of Voir Dire, the Jury System: A Critical Overview, 4 SAGE CRIM. JUSTICE SYS. 
ANNUALS (1975); Hill, Effective Techniques of Jury Selection and Jury Argument in Per- 
sonal Injury Cases, 21 TEXAS B.J. 221 (1958); Jones, Peremptory Challenges-Should Rule 
233 Be Changed?, 45 TEXAS L. REV. 80 (1966); Kaufman, The Judges and Jurors: Recent 
Developments in Selection of Jurors and Fair Trial-Free Press, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 179 
(1969); Lay, In a Fair Adversary System the Lawyer Should Conduct the Voir Dire Exami- 
nation of the Jury, 13 JUDGES' J .  63 (1974); Levit & Chernick, Trial Judges Should Con- 
duct Voir Dire Examination, 13 JUDGES' J .  65 (1974); Levit, Nelson, Ball & Chernick, 
Expediting Voir Dire: An Empirical Study, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 916 (1971); Oberer, Does 
Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital Punishment Constitute Denial of 
Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEXAS L. REV. 545 (1961); Padawer-Singer, Singer & 
Singer, Voir Dire by Two Lawyers: An Essential Safeguard, 57 JUDICATURE 386 (1974) 
[hereinafter cited as Padawer-Singer]; Rothblatt, Techniques for Jury Selection, 2 CRIM. 
L. BULL. NO. 4 a t  14 (1966); Schulman, Shaver, Colman, Emrich & Christie, Recipe for a 
Jury, 7 PSYCH. TODAY 37 (1973); Shepherd, Techniques of Jury Selection from Defendant's 
Viewpoint, A.B.A. SEC. INS., NEG. & COMP. L. 359 (1965); Urbom, Picking a Jury and 
Referring to Evidence, 46 NEB. L. REV. 528 (1967); Comment, Jurors' Knowledge of the 
Law: Voir Dire on Jury Instructions, 7 IDAHO L. REV. 257 (1970); Note, Peremptory Chal- 
lenges and Change of Venue, 27 U. CIN. L. REV. 87 (1958); Criminal Procedure-State 
Allowed Peremptory Challenge of Previously Accepted Juror After Defense Exhausted 
Peremptory Challenges, 9 DEPAUL . REV. 275 (1960). 
13. See Zeisel, supra notell. 
14. Telephone interview with Maurice Rosenberg (Nash Professor of Law, Columbia 
Unviersity), Feb. 27, 1974. See also NAT'L CONF. OF STATE TRIAL JUDGES, THE STATE TRIAL 
JUDGES' BOOK 165 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as THE STATE TRIAL JUDGES' BOOK]; 
W. PROBERT, LAW, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION (1972); Edises, One- Way Communica- 
tions: Achille's Heel of The Jury System, 13 JUDGES' J .  78 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 
Edises]; Hacker, Who Killed Harry Gleason?, 234 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 52 (Dec. 1974) 
[hereinafter cited as Hacker]; Rosenberg, Devising Procedures That Are Civil to Promote 
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communication between the judge, lawyers, witnesses, and jury 
is critical to the proper functioning of the system. It is self-evident 
that if the communication process is not effective-if jurors are 
unsure about the evidence, unclear on the meaning of the law, 
confused by legal jargon, bewildered by trial procedure, or uncer- 
tain of the role they are to play-the jury cannot be expected to 
perform its function intelligently. 
The studies reported in this article indicate that such a con- 
dition of pervasive confusion does in fact exist among jurors in the 
present jury system and is largely a result of poor communication. 
Jurors often improperly find the facts because the concept of legal 
evidence is seldom adequately communicated to them. They 
often improperly apply the law because they are unable to com- 
prehend the jury instructions. They often fail to rationally con- 
sider legal arguments because they have difficulty understanding 
legal jargon. Also, time is often wasted in the deliberation room 
because the jury does not fully understand its function. 
The purpose of this article is to point out some of the jury 
trial practices which "do not make sense" in light of current 
communication theory and research and which adversely affect 
a jury's performance. Toward that end, the article first discusses 
two empirical studies which illustrate the juror confusion result- 
ing from the present system of trial communication. The article 
then suggests six areas in which jury trial communication could 
be improved in order to alleviate such juror confusion: the word- 
ing of jury instructions, the timing of jury instructions, juror ori- 
entation, two-way communication, note taking, and juror selec- 
tion. 
A. Empirical Research I: Confusion in  the Deliberation 
The primary purpose of the first study considered was to 
analyze three jury simulation techniques in order to estimate 
their relative usefulness for further research into the decision- 
making processes in civil jury deliberations. The emphasis of the 
study, therefore, was on the manner in which jurors process infor- 
mation, organize their deliberations, and arrive a t  verdicts. A 
Justice That  Is Civilized, 69 MICH.  L. REV. 797, 817 (1971); Rosenberg, New Challenges 
and Responses In Resolving Civil Disputes, 1972 LAW & SOC. ORD. 359, 368. 
15. This research was funded by the Margaret H. and James E. Kelly Foundation, 
Inc., and the Tozer Foundations, Inc. 
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serendipitous by-product was the discovery of the difficulty jurors 
had in the deliberation process as a result of confusion and misun- 
derstanding of various legal concepts, trial procedures, and jury 
instructions. These latter findings are the primary focus of this 
article. 
1. Procedures 
a. Jury trial simulation. The sixteen juries studied each 
participated in one of the three different types of simulation: six 
were "fact sheet" juries (the jurors were provided with a summary 
sheet of important facts and issues and with written jury instruc- 
tions), six were "audio trial" juries (the jurors listened to a de- 
tailed audio recording of an edited trial), and four were "live 
trial" juries (the jurors participated in an actual live trial situa- 
tion). The simulation sessions were held in realistic settings uti- 
lizing a courtroom, bailiff, and jury room. In the live trial set- 
tings, an actual judge, attorneys, and witnesses were used as well. 
All juries deliberated on the same essential set of facts taken 
from an actual trial involving an automobile-pedestrian accident. 
All subjects were regular county jurors from the Minneapolis and 
Chicago areas who had been randomly selected from a larger jury 
panel. Each twelve member jury's deliberation was videotaped. 
Although the jurors were aware that they were being taped, the 
equipment was inconspicuously placed, and procedures were de- 
veloped to desensitize the jurors to the cameras. 
b. Analysis techniques. The recordings of the deliberations 
were quantitatively analyzed through a content analysis form 
developed as a part of this study: the Civil Jury Deliberation 
(C JD) Process Analysis. The C JD Processs Analysis is a specially 
designed computer assisted content analysis technique for record- 
ing and quantifying each juror's comments as well as collectively 
recording the process in which the jury reaches its decision. This 
technique permits an empiricist to view the complex jury 
decision-making process through an analytical approach which 
uses three to six time phases, four general categories of comments 
(substantive, procedural, disruptive, and immaterial), twenty 
sub-categories, and three directional value judgements (positive, 
negative, and neutral).18 By the use of recordings and transcripts, 
16. The Civil Jury Deliberation Process Analysis used the following breakdown for 
quantitatively analyzing the jurors' deliberation: 
SUBSTANTIVE (TASK) 
(1) Credibility of witnesses (directional value judgments + o -); 
(2) Credibility of attorneys (directional value judgments + o -); 
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(3) Determination of plaintiff's liability claim and defendant's defenses (direc- 
tional value judgments + o -); 
(4) Determination of the extent of plaintiff's losses, injuries, and suffering 
(directional value judgments + o -); 
(5) Discussion regarding the amount of the award: 
a. Discussion of award as a total sum rather than itemizing costs, 
b. Itemization of damages, 
(1) Property damages 
(2) Loss of wages 
(3) Medical costs 
(4) Suffering 
(5) Permanent injuries 
(6) Other (specify) 
(6) References about judge's instructions, rules or clarification; and definitions 
of legal terms; 
(7) Comments about lack of evidence, missing facts, or experimental condi- 
tions; 
PROCEDURAL (TASK) 
(8) Selection of foreman; 
(9) Procedural planning; 
(10) Voting on liability, negligence, or related issues leading to liability deter- 
mination; 




(13) Discussion of trial and nontrial functionaries' reputations and/or person- 
alities, (directional value judgements + o -); - 
(14) Discussion of insurance or the party's ability to pay or absorb a financial 
amount, (directional value judgments + o -); 
(15) References to attorneys' fees; 
(16-17) Special immaterial categories (which are defined as prominent imma- 
terial issues) arise from various individual trials' (directional value judgment 
+ 0 -); 
(18) Other miscellaneous immaterial comments; 
(19) Social-emotional interaction and joking; 
(20) Consideration of the spirit of law and the pragmatic necessity for compar- 
ative negligence. 
Substantive content related to the verdict (task) in a direct way and often contributed 
direct insights which led to some change in the group's perception of the verdict. Content 
which clearly seemed to pertain to one of the seven substantive categories was easily 
identified as substantive content. For example, a statement such as "The blonde witness 
was probably in the best position to see the color of the traffic light" was classified as 
category 1 (witness credibility) of the substantive aggregated category. 
Procedural content related to the (task) verdict in an indirect way; such a contribu- 
tion was not meant to provide a change in the direction of the verdict. Procedural com- 
ments were statements about the group's operation (e.g., "What should we discuss 
next?"-category 9). All voting processes were classified as procedural. 
The disruptive category was used when the jury no longer functioned as a unit but 
broke into sub-group discussions for prolonged periods of time (over seven seconds). 
Immaterial content was non-task comment which was contrary to the rules of law as 
stated in the judge's instructions or which was clearly non-task oriented such as a social 
facilitation comment to another member (e.g., "That certainly is a pretty dress you have 
on today,"-category 19). 
For a comparison of another kind of content analysis of jury deliberations see R. 
Simon, Trial by Jury: A Critical Assessment, in APPLIED SOCIOLOGY: OPPORTUNITIES AND 
PROBLEMS 297 (S. Miller & A. Gouldner eds. 1965). 
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an investigator codes each juror's comments in the above terms 
and measures the length of each statement in seconds.17 This 
numerical data can be analyzed with various statistical manipu- 
lations. 
In addition to the quantitative analysis, repeated observa- 
tions of the videotaped jury deliberations and information ob- 
tained from questionnaires completed by each juror permitted an 
extensive qualitative case study analysis of each jury.ls 
2. Results and discussion 
a. Quantitative analysis. The distribution of the typical 
jury's communication, as measured in time and converted into a 
percentage of the total deliberation time, was most frequently 
found in eleven sub-categories as shown in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
Distribution of Mean Percentages of 
Jury Deliberation Time for Various Categories 
Category Description Percentage 
Witness Credibility Discussion 
Attorneys: Discussion 
Determination of Liability t I
Determination of Plaintiff's Losses 
& Injuries 
Jury Instructions 
Lack of Evidence in Trial 
Procedural Planning (Voting) 
Comments about Insurance 
Comments about Attorney's fees 
Other Misc. Immaterial Comments 
Social-Emotional Interaction (Jurors) 
As can be seen from categories 1, 3, and 4, two-thirds of the 
typical jury's time was spent trying to evaluate and determine the 
facts of the case, while almost another 10 percent of the jury's 
time was spent applying the rules of law as presented in the jury 
instructions (category 6). 
The deliberation time spent on jury instructions (category 6) 
warrants closer scrutiny. Some juries were given only oral instruc- 
17. The final inter-coder reliability agreement on the category system was 95.0 per- 
cent, and the agreement for directional value judgments was 81.2 percent. 
18. See text accompanying notes 20-24 infra. Detailed case study analysis of the 
sixteen juries is available in Forston (1968), supra note 7, a t  172. 
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tions, while other juries received both oral and written instruc- 
tions. Those juries that received only oral instructions, spent but 
6 percent of their time attempting to understand and apply rules 
of law. In contrast, those that received written instructions spent 
more than twice as much time (14 percent) applying the law. 
While this difference in time expended attempting to apply jury 
instructions is itself significant, the merits of the written charges 
over the oral charges were even more dramatically revealed by the 
subsequent qualitative analysis which is reported below. 
Immaterial comments about insurance, attorney fees, and so 
forth (categories 14, 15, and 18) account for 2.1 percent of the 
deliberation time. The study revealed that  when immaterial 
statements were made, other jurors usually interrupted in order 
to point out that consideration of immaterial matters constituted 
improper deliberation. This was particularly common in juries 
which had written instructions. 
Discussion about a lack of evidence (category 7) often consis- 
ted of jurors expressing a desire to have been allowed to ask 
"obvious questions" during the trial. This concern was also made 
manifest by a desire to have the deliberating jury ask the judge 
for more information or clarification. However, only one jury de- 
cided to ask a formal question. Most jurors were discouraged from 
asking questions because judges had the reputation of refusing to 
re~pond. '~  
b. Qualitative analysis. Qualitative analysis of the juries' 
performances revealed that the juries that had been provided 
with written copies of instructions for each juror were more effi- 
cient and exhibited higher quality deliberations. Jurors with writ- 
ten instructions made fewer explicit comments about confusion, 
spent less time inappropriately applying the law, wasted less time 
trying to ascertain the meaning of the instructions, and concen- 
trated more on relevant facts and proper application of the law. 
Also, jurors provided with written charges exhibited more confi- 
dence that they had reached the best decision. 
Additionally, qualitative analysis revealed numerous instan- 
ces of individual juror's misunderstanding, as well as entire jury 
confusion, over legal terminology, trial procedures, jury instruc- 
tions, and jury room procedures. For instance, one-third of the 
juries studied had difficulty understanding and applying the doc- 
trine of contributory negligence. This difficulty was illustrated by 
-- 
19. A jury's reluctance to return to a judge for help is a common problem according 
to KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 1, a t  510, and North Carolina Jury Charge, supra note 
10, a t  461. 
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the phrasing of questions upon which jurors voted. One foreman, 
for example, asked the jury to respond to the following question: 
"Who was at  fault-the car, the plaintiff, or question mark (un- 
decided)?" Some jurors were asked to choose between the follow- 
ing options: "defendant guilty" or "defendant not guilty." None 
of these problem questions voted on by the juries demonstrates a 
proper understanding of contributory negligence. Most juries fi- 
nally seemed to work out the confusion over contributory negli- 
gence, but some deliberated erroneously about this concept for 
nearly an hour. Again, those juries with written instructions were 
consistently able to resolve confusion more quickly than those 
that only heard oral instructions. 
Instances of confusion over abstract legal phrases and jury 
instructions were numerous. The application of concepts such as 
proximate cause, preponderance of evidence, contributory negli- 
gence, and how monetary damages should be determined were 
frequent sources of misunderstandings. The significance of this 
confusion is partly illustrated by the fact that, while confronta- 
tions between individual jurors might be expected when the jury 
is discussing issues or values involved in a case, this study re- 
vealed that a substantial amount of juror confrontation was the 
direct result of trying to understand or apply legal terms or proce- 
dures which were confusing.20 
Confusion also resulted from seemingly clear instructions 
describing deliberation procedures. In three juries the jurors were 
asked to vote by secret ballot and to make a letter "P" for plain- 
tiff or a letter "D" for defendant. Some jurors printed "D" be- 
cause they thought the  defendant was guilty and should pay 
damages; others printed "D" because they thought the defendant 
was not liable and deserved to win the case. In one jury when the 
20. Excerpts from the jury deliberations illustrate some of the confusion and confron- 
tation. 
A juror talking to the foreman about contributory negligence: 
Juror: "We are not attorneys, and you're talking like an attorney to me. I don't 
understand what you're talking about really. [Pause] Do You?" 
Foreman: "Are you talking about me?" 
Juror: [Pointing his finger at the foreman] "Yes! I don't understand this. 
This is legal terms; it isn't everyday terms. I'm trying to learn something." 
Another jury was having problems understanding and following the judge's instruc- 
tions. This jury had been supplied with only one copy of written instruction. The foreman 
was planning to read again from the instructions, when a juror stopped him to say: "You 
have already read them to me ten times, and I already have them crushed into my mind." 
Note that the last noted example may also indicate a problem with providing only 
one copy of the written instructions rather than enough copies for all jurors. In juries which 
had written copies for all jurors, this kind of confrontation never occurred. 
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secret ballots were being tallied, a juror said: "Well, I meant the 
opposite with my 'D' so put it in the 'P' pile.'' 
One of the conclusions of this study, based on both quantita- 
tive and qualitative analysis, was that jury instructions, when 
understood, have considerable influence on the decision-making 
of juries. The use of jury instructions as a basis for his reasoning 
universally enhanced the cogency of a juror's argument. Signifi- 
cantly, no jury disregarded a juror's argument supported by the 
rules of law as explained in the jury instructions in favor of an- 
other juror's argument which was incompatible with those in- 
s t ruc t ion~.~~ 
The study also tested the hypothesis that  the pre- 
deliberation preferences of individual jurors (as obtained by ques- 
tionnaires administered after the  deliberation^)^^ accurately indi- 
cate the direction of the final jury verdict. This hypothesis proved 
to be a good predictor for the direction of jury verdicts for more 
than 86 percent of the juries.23 Other studies corroborate this 
conclusion and afford further insight by revealing that the vast 
majority of jurors reach a fairly definite decision before all the 
evidence has been presented in the trial.24 These collective prefer- 
ences typically predetermine the final verdict. 
B. Empirical Research 11: Misunderstanding of Jury 
Instructions 
The second series of research projects to be considered in this 
article focused on jurors' comprehension and application of jury 
instructions. The descriptive research questions for investigating 
the problem of juror confusion were: 
(1) What percentage of the jury instructions do individual 
jurors retain and comprehend? 
21. This finding on the influence of jury instructions is supported by the conclusions 
of Kline & Jess, supra note 7, at 116, but is a t  odds with the survey information collected 
by the University of Chicago Jury Project, as reported in KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 1, 
and Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 751 (1959). 
22. The questionnaire on pre-deliberation preference and other information was not 
administered to the jurors before the deliberation in order to avoid possible contamination 
of the jury deliberation. 
23. This percentage figure is based on the combined results of studies of twenty-two 
juries (sixteen juries from the original study and six juries from a later follow-up study). 
24. See, e.g., James, supra note 3, at 569; KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 487; 
SIMON, supra note 3, at 117; Stone, A Primary Effect in Decision-Making by Jurors, 19 J. 
COMMUNICATIONS 239 (Sept. 1969); Weld & Danzig, supra note 7; Weld & Roff, supra note 
7; Blade, Professor [Harry Kalven]: Juries Often Decide Early, Minneapolis Star, July 
29, 1967, 4 A, a t  9. Compare the above cited studies with the following which is tangen- 
tially related but has some findings which are in disagreement: Lawson, The Law of 
Primacy in the Criminal Courtroom, 77 J. Soc. PSYCH. 121 (1969). 
60 11 JURY TRIAL COMMUNICATION 613 
(2) What percentage of the jury instructions do face-to-face 
deliberating juries retain and comprehend? 
1. Procedures 
Two sets of jury instructions were obtained from the Polk 
County District Court in Des Moines, Iowa: instructions for a 
civil personal injury case and instructions for a criminal murder 
case. A total of 114 experienced Polk County jurors participated 
in this study on their last day of jury service. The group was 
divided into two smaller groups of 54 and 60 jurors. One group of 
jurors participated in the civil case and the other participated in 
the criminal case. The jurors were never told that their compre- 
hension of jury instructions would be tested. 
An investigator gave the jurors of each large group detailed 
background information pertaining to the case to which they were 
assigned so that the jurors could relate the jury instructions to a 
concrete factual situation. Next, the investigator read the appro- 
priate set of jury instructions to each of the groups. Immediately 
after the reading of the instructions, a multiple choice retention- 
comprehension test based on the instructions was administered 
to each individual juror. Each test consisted of fifteen multiple 
choice questions. Each question had five possible answers, thus 
establishing a guess chance of 20 percent. 
Following the test, the jurors were randomly divided into 
face-to-face deliberating panels of six jurors. Each jury was given 
the same test that the jurors had individually taken, and assigned 
the task of reaching a unanimous group decision on each of the 
fifteen questions. 
This testing of the jurors' comprehension of judicial instruc- 
tions was conducted under almost ideal conditions: the jurors 
were experienced (nearing the end of a three-week term); the 
instructions were short (both sets were approximately 20 minutes 
in length); the instructions involved relatively ordinary issues 
rather than complex issues; the experimental research took place 
during the morning, while the jurors should have been mentally 
alert; and the comprehension test measured immediate rather 
than delayed comprehension. 
An earlier study using identical research procedures was con- 
ducted for comparative purposes using 106 Drake University and 
Grandview College students as jurors. 
2. Results and discussion 
The results of the two studies of juror comprehension are 
revealed in Table 2. 
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TABLE 2 
Individual Jurors' and Deliberating Juries' Mean Percent of 








Individual Deliberating Individual Deliberating Individual Deliberating 
Jurors Juries Jurors Juries Jurors Juries 
(Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) 
County 
Jurors 46.0 60.1 53.12" 63.3 49.9 61.8 
Students 71.3 80.6 59.8 82.9 67.1 81.5 
As indicated by the table, the deliberating juries scored 10 
to 14 percentage points above the mean of individual jurors. This 
improved performance is probably attributable to an "assembly 
effect" resulting from the face-to-face i n t e r a ~ t i o n . ~ ~  
Mean comprehension levels achieved by the county jurors 
should be viewed as more valid indicators of an actual jury situa- 
tion than the student comprehension levels. This is because the 
former represent more closely the demographic characteristics 
which would be present in any actual jury. The student data were 
included for the comparative purpose of showing the effects of 
higher education on the understanding of jury instructions and 
trial procedure. One implication that might be drawn from the 
substantially higher student scores on the comprehension test is 
that systematically excusing our better educated citizens from 
jury duty makes an important difference in the ability of the jury 
to perform its expected function.27 
Analysis of the individual jurors' understanding of the jury 
instructions shows that some parts of the instructions were more 
confusing than others. For example, 85 percent of the jurors 
missed at  least one question on what constitutes evidence and 37 
-- - - -- 
25. The Sigworth study, described in the text accompanying notes 29-32 infra, exam- 
ined criminal jury instructions only, but came to an amazingly similar juror comprehen- 
sion level of 52.1 percent. 
26. The "assembly effect" occurs when a group of persons is able to achieve collec- 
tively something which could not have been achieved by one person working alone. For a 
discussion of the "assembly effect" see B. COLLINS & H. GUETZKOW, A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
OF GROUP ROCESS FOR DECISION-MAKING 58 (1964). 
27. This writer has no explanation for the differences in percentages between civil and 
criminal cases, except for the fact that one set of instructions may have been more com- 
plex than the other. One would not, however, ordinarily expect one kind of instruction to 
be inherently more complex than another; a larger sample of cases will have to be investi- 
gated before a conclusion can be reached. 
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percent missed two out of the three questions about evidence. 
Also, nearly three-fourths of the jurors could not choose the cor- 
rect response to the question pertaining to proximate cause. 
Similar results were obtained from analysis of the juries' per- 
formances. Even under the favorable conditions of immediate 
recall and group interaction, 86 percent of the criminal juries were 
unable to respond accurately to what is proof of guilt, and over 
one-half of the civil juries did not correctly answer the question 
on proximate cause. The most shocking discovery was that four- 
fifths of the juries missed one or more of the three questions on 
evidence. Since juries are expected to weigh the relevant evidence 
presented and ignore both immaterial and illegitimate sources of 
information, the confusion over what is and what is not evidence 
may be grounds for serious concern, especially where pre-trial 
publicity is involved. 
3. Related studies 
The results of the above-described study are similar to those 
reached in certain other empirical studies. One such study found 
that up to 85 percent of the jurors tested could not choose correct 
definitions of the following terms:28 
Inference Included Offense 
Impeach Criminal Intent 
Stipulate Specific Intent 
Voir Dire Material Allegation 
Proximate Cause Preponderance of Evidence 
Circumstantial Conflictive 
Probative 
A second study presented legal concepts and other words 
commonly found in instructions to jurors and empirically tested 
their understanding of the terms. Some of the results obtained 
give rise to concern. For instance, while 58 percent of the jurors 
tested selected the correct meaning of "speculate," 28 percent 
thought that the word meant either to examine or c~nclude.~"  
This simple example suggests that it would be unwise for a judge 
to instruct jurors "not to speculate." 
By way of further example, the same study demonstrated 
that while two-thirds of the jurors understood what "presumed to 
28. This study is reported in O'Reilly, supra note 10, a t  73. 
29. H. Sigworth & F. Henze, Jurors' Comprehension of Jury Instructions in Southern 
Arizona, appendix C, a t  3 (1973) (unpublished report) [hereinafter cited as Sigworth & 
Henze] . 
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be innocent" meant, and only two percent reported that the de- 
fendant must in any way prove his own innocence, fully one-third 
of the jurors tested agreed that "when the state has finished 
presenting its evidence, you must wait to see if the defendant can 
prove he is innocent." Similarly, although three-quarters of the 
jurors correctly understood that they must come to a unanimous 
verdict, 20 percent thought that a non-unanimous verdict was 
sufficient for a not-guilty verdict. Still other studies have found 
that jurors frequently have an intellectual understanding of a 
legal term or procedure but are unable to apply it.30 
It is significant to note that two of the studies described in 
this section reach the conclusion that prior jury deliberation ex- 
perience helped improve jurors' understanding of instructions by 
5 to 10 percent.31 One study found the most dramatic improve- 
ment (almost 20 percent) among jurors who had taken the same 
test before.32 This last noted rate of improvement is encouraging 
because it indicates that after repeated exposure jurors are willing 
to listen more carefully to instructions and information in order 
to clarify points. 
II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS: SIXAREAS FOR IMPROVING 
COMMUNICATION IN JURY TRIALS 
The studies described above reveal a sustantial amount of 
confusion in the jury deliberation process which can largely be 
attributed to a failure on the part of courts to communicate effec- 
tively with jurors. I t  is self-evident that this confusion cannot 
help but interfere with the proper functioning of the jury. If the 
jury is to be preserved as a basic part of our system of justice, it 
is essential that attention be directed toward improving the effec- 
tiveness of communication in trials. The following sections of this 
article present suggestions for improving trial communication. 
These suggestions relate to the wording of jury instructions, the 
timing of jury instructions, juror orientation, two-way communi- 
cation, note-taking, and juror selection. 
A. The  Wording of Jury Instructions 
1. The  problem of legalese 
Jury instructions are intended to delineate the issues in- 
volved in a case, and to inform the jury of the applicable rules of 
30. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 10. 
31. O'Reilly, supra note 10, at 74; Sigworth, supra note 10, at 23. 
32. Sigworth, supra note 10, at 23. 
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law. The above studies, however, demonstrate that typical in- 
structions do not adequately achieve these goals.33 Instead they 
often leave the jurors confused over such fundamental legal con- 
cepts as the meaning of evidence or negligence. Much of this 
misunderstanding can be traced to the legal jargon used in the 
instructions which, although technically correct, is largely mean- 
ingless to a jury of laymen. 
The literature is rich with those who complain of the legalese 
used in triak3' The opinions of these critics are strongly sup- 
ported by the studies described above. In fact, all jury studies to 
date, but for a single exception,35 reach the conclusion that le- 
galese in trials, particularly as contained in jury instructions, is 
neither adequately understood nor properly applied by jurors. 
In addition, jurors themselves are asking for better instruc- 
tions. In one 80 percent of the jurors surveyed found 
substantial room for improvement in jury instructions. Almost 
three-fourths of those jurors specifically recommended the judge 
give less complicated instructions and that the jurors be given the 
opportunity to ask clarifying questions before retiring to the jury 
room. 37 
The challenging solution to this widely recognized problem 
is to draft substantively correct instructions which are suffi- 
ciently clear and understandable that lay jurors can apply them 
in the deliberation process. This solution is complicated by the 
fact that jury instructions must be able to pass the scrutiny of an 
appellate court and be found technically accurate. Such accuracy 
33. See text accompanying notes 20 and 25-32 supra. 
34. John H. Holloway, while Executive Director of the Oregon State Bar Association, 
spoke of lawyers using "high sounding phrases, managing to say in fifty words what could 
have been said in seven." F. WOLESLAGEL, JURY 76 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WOLESLAGEL 
(1972)l. Justice Benjamin Cardozo often referred to legal writing as being "so overloaded 
with all its possible qualifications that it will tumble down of its own weight." R. FLESCH, 
THE ART OF READABLE WRITING 111 (1949). Charles Joiner has argued: 
One of the weaknesses of jury decision-making lies in the instructions on the law 
given the jury a t  the close of a case. . . . On the whole, judges have done a very 
poor job of instructing. Some of them ramble on interminably, using legal lan- 
guage not easily understood by the jury, which not uncommonly fails to grasp 
some significant question of law as a result. If better verdicts are to be had, 
attention must be given to the instructional process. 
C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 83 (1962). 
35. Moffat, As Jurors See a Lawsuit, 24 ORE. L. REV. 199 (1945). Moffat's study has 
a serious defect in that he asked only attitude questions, which were too general to be of 
any specific help regarding understanding of the instructions. No attempt was made to 
test the effectiveness with which the jurors tried to apply the law. 
36. O'Reilly, supra note 10. For a description of this study, see the text accompanying 
notes 31 & 32 supra. 
37. O'Reilly, supra note 10, a t  73-74. 
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is most difficult to achieve without using legal terms of art which 
have precise meaning to members of the legal profession. Unfor- 
tunately these same terms are very confusing to the vast majority 
of lay jurors.38 As stated in the California Jury Instructions: 
I t  has been bruited that instructions are written in English that 
is too good, too highbrow; they ought to be written in the lan- 
guage of the street. . . . No one, for us a t  least, ever has taken 
one of our instructions and translated it into the language of the 
street still correctly stating the law.3g 
2. Pattern instructions 
One possible means of improvement lies in the area of uni- 
form or pattern jury instructions. Thirty states have adopted 
their use in civil trials, and drafting projects are planned or un- 
derway in ten othem40 Some federal court judges are also making 
use of standard instruction guides.41 
The pattern instruction movement constitutes a giant step 
toward making instructions more understandable to laymen. For 
example, the Arizona Jury Instruction Project empirically tested 
drafts of that state's patterned instructions to discover vocabu- 
lary and legal concepts which were confusing to jurors. The most 
38. Judge Robert McBride described the dilemma a trial judge faces in trying to 
communicate with jurors and with appellate courts: 
The oral delivery of instructions justifies resorting to the best and most 
effective use of language available. Every instruction is a test of the skill and 
art of the judge, a test which is not graded in points or personal success, but by 
justice between the parties. 
Instructions must meet still another test. They must be approved for tech- 
nical accuracy by the reviewing court. This additional test discourages the prep- 
aration of instructions for effective oral use in the courtroom. It  frightens new 
judges to the point that the necessity for comprehension bjr the jurors is ignored. 
How well a judge succeeds in conveying his message to twelve captive 
listeners may determine the verdict. There is no opportunity to rehearse, edit 
or improve the immediate product. There is no examination of the jurors to find 
out if the message was effective. The success of any instruction to a jury is not 
reflected in its brilliance or in its eloquence but by a fair and just verdict. 
. . . .  
Ordinary language requires all the skill of a master of the law and the 
ingenuity of a professional author. We must keep in mind the limited time at 
the judge's disposal and the tremendous gap he must bridge to bring the specific 
law to the jury. Certainly it must be accurate, but if it fails to bridge the gap it 
might as well not be given. Comprehension of the jury and not approval by the 
reviewing court is the first objective. 
R. MCBRIDE, THE ART OF INSTRUCTING THE JURY 180, 191 (1969). 
39. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: 44 Civil (4th ed.). 
40. J .  ALFINI, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS REPORT NO. 6, AMERICAN JUDICATURE 
SOCIETY 4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ALFINI]. 
41. Id. a t  39; WOLESLAGEL (1972), supra note 34, at 80; Meyer, Pattern Instructions 
Perfected, 55 TRIAL JUDGES' J .  1 (1966); Meyer & Rosenberg, supra note 10, a t  105. 
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frequent problem areas of the instructions were redrafted to avoid 
troublesome vocabulary. The redrafted instructions were tested 
again for juror comprehension; the results were en~ourag ing .~~  
Other states have also used resourceful and imaginative 
methods in an endeavor to improve their jury instructions. Mon- 
tana has employed a communication specialist on the drafting 
committee.43 Oregon has also utilized a speech communcation 
specialist to assay the juror's comprehension of instructions by 
using systematic, post-verdict interviews and experiments with 
simulated juries .44 
On the other hand, judges should not assume that all instruc- 
tions taken from a uniform or pattern jury instruction guide book 
are necessarily understandable to jurors or contain the best 
phrasing with which to instruct a Some recent pattern 
instructions were used in several jury instruction in- 
cluding those described above which indicated a serious need for 
clearer instructions. In addition, judges need to avoid using the 
pattern jury guide books in a "cut and paste" manner with no 
system, transitions, or logical arrangement for jurors to readily 
understand/' 
3. Written instructions 
Another means of improving the jury's ability to understand 
and apply jury instructions is to provide the jury with written 
copies of their instructions for use during deliberation. Approxi- 
mately twenty states use written instructions, but only sixteen 
permit them to be taken into the jury room? Many federal and 
state courts do not allow written instructions a t  all. And yet, as 
the research reported above has i n d i ~ a t e d , ~ ~  the advantages of 
using written instructions are dramatic. In the first study, those 
juries supplied with written instructions spent more than twice 
as much deliberation time specifically applying the rules of law 
as did the juries that only heard oral instructions. A by-product 
42. Sigworth, supra note 10, a t  9. 
43. Meyer & Rosenberg, supra note 10, a t  106. 
44. Id. 
45. See  MCBRIDE, supra note 10, a t  183; WOLESLAGEL (1972), supra note 34, at  80-81. 
46. Pattern instructions were used in all the studies by O'Reilly, Sigworth, Forston 
and O'Mara. 
47. See ALFINI, supra note 40, a t  13-16; MCBRIDE, supra note 10, a t  183. 
48. Maloney, Should Jurors Have Written Instructions?, 6 TRIAL JUDGES' J. 18 (1967) 
[hereinafter cited as Maloney]. See also Cunningham, Should Instructions Go Into the 
Jury Room?, 33 CAL. S.B.J. 278 (1958); Comment, The Jury Instruction Process-Apathy 
or Aggressive Reform?, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 137 (1965). 
49. See text accompanying notes 19 and 20 supra. 
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of this application was a more efficient and higher quality delib- 
eration process. Furthermore, the jurors using written charges 
exhibited more confidence that they had reached the best deci- 
sion. Similarly, another study, not reported herein, found that 
allowing written instructions in the jury room results in a 12 
percent improvement in juror comprehen~ion.~~ Moreover, many 
jurors want written instructions before them-more than 45 per- 
cent of the jurors surveyed in two studies strongly recommended 
that instructions be submitted in written form? 
Although no research has concluded that oral instructions 
are in any way superior to written instructions, many trial judges 
oppose giving written instructions to jurors. One study reports 
that objecting judges said it would require more work and involve 
delay for the judge to first deliver instructions orally and then 
wait for them to be typed.52 Of course, no such problem would be 
encountered if the judge simply read a previously prepared set of 
written instructions to the jury and then supplied them with 
copies. As recognized in The  State Trial Judges' Book, such a 
practice would likely result in the use of more complete, cohesive, 
understandable, and unrepetitive i n s t r ~ c t i o n . ~ ~  
Other judges argue that if written charges are used, the jury 
will read only a portion of what is given them in writing, and then 
give that portion undue emphasis. However, this risk seems no 
greater than the risk that jurors will remember only a part of an 
oral charge and give the remembered part undue emphasis.54 Fi- 
nally, the fear that written instructions will give an advantage to 
literate jurors, or those with good eyesight, can be allayed by 
making the instructions available to the jury in the form of tape 
recordings or video tape." A corollary to this last noted concern 
is that when written instructions are used, each juror should be 
given a copy to avoid the danger that the person with the only 
copy of the instructions will dominate the deliberation? 
B. The  Timing of Jury Instructions 
1. The  "rules at the end of the game" problem 
Typically, a judge instructs a jury orally for ten minutes to 
50. Sigworth & Henze, supra note 29, at 7. 
51. Maloney, supra note 48, at 18; O'Reilly, supra note 10, at 74. 
52. Maloney, supra note 48, at 18. 
53. THE STATE TRIAL JUDGES' BOOK, supra note 14, at 159-60. 
54. Id. 
55. See Katz, Reinstructing the Jury by Tape Recording, 41 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y 148 
(1958); Meyer & Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 107. 
56. See note 20 supra; Forston (1973), supra note 10, at 69. 
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two hours5' after all the evidence and closing arguments have 
been presented. The instructions generally define what is and 
what is not evidence, point out the central issues, present the 
applicable law, and describe the function of the jury. Thus, it is 
not until the last minutes of the trial that the jury is told the 
"rules of the game."58 The problem was well stated by the Honor- 
able E. Barrett Prettyman, formerly of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia: 
[ a t  makes no sense to have a juror listen to days of testi- 
mony only then to be told that he and his confreres are the sole 
judges of the facts, that the accused is presumed to be innocent, 
that  the government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, etc. What manner of mind can go back over a stream of 
conflicting statements of alleged facts, recall the intonations, 
the demeanor, or even the existence of the witnesses, and re- 
trospectively fit all these recollections into a pattern of evalua- 
tion and judgment given him for the first time after the events? 
The human mind cannot do so. It is not a magnetized tape from 
which recorded speech can be repeated a t  chosen speed and 
volume. The fact of the matter is that this order of procedure 
makes much of the trial of a lawsuit mere mumbo jumbo. It 
sounds all right to the professional technicians who are the judge 
and the lawyers. It reads all right to the professional technicians 
who are the court of appeals. But to the laymen sitting in the 
box, restricted to listening, the whole thing is a fog.5B 
It is hardly surprising that juries often have questions regarding 
what constitutes evidence, what the legal issues are, and how the 
law relates to the facts of the case. 
The argument for changing the timing of instructions is even 
more compelling in light of research indicating that jurors are 
unable to suspend their decisions until the end of the trial? 
Clearly, if jurors make their decision as the evidence is being 
presented, as some research indicates they do, a charge at the end 
of a long trial comes too late to have much effect. 
2. Opening and closing jury instructions 
Discussion about the timing of instructions has focused on 
57. For example, in the "Harrisburg Seven" trial in 1972, the jury was given two 
hours of instruction by the judge. 
58. Prettyman, Jury Instructions-First or Last?, 46 A.B.A.J. 1066 (1960). 
59. Id. Others have expressed concerns similar to Judge Prettyman's regarding the 
timing of jury instructions. See, e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, 117 (1949); Hacker, supra 
note 14, at 56; North Carolina Jury Charge, supra note 10, at 462; WOLESLAGEL (1972) 
supra note 34, at 57. 
60. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra. See also Luck, supra note 7, at 90. 
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two alternatives: providing instruction at  the end of the trial or 
both at  the beginning and-the end of the trial. No one seriously 
suggests omitting final instructions. Final instructions provide an 
essential summary of the issues and the applicable law and are 
most appropriate just prior to jury deliberation, as they leave the 
most important concepts of the case fresh in jurors' minds. How- 
ever, note that providing additional instruction at  the beginning 
of the trial would sacrifice none of the benefits of closing instruc- 
tions, but would add the benefit of explaining the responsibilities 
and functions of the jurors a t  the outset. Opening instruction 
could also give the jurors a basic understanding of the trial which 
is about to be presented. The importance of this practice is clear 
when one realizes that few jurors have served before and most are 
unfamiliar with, or have distorted expectations as to, jury trial 
 proceeding^.^' 
3. Continuing jury instructions 
A third alternative, the option of giving "continuing instruc- 
tions" a t  various stages of the trial, on a "need to know" basis, 
coupled with a final summarizing charge,62 should also be given 
consideration. Such a practice would best enable the jury to 
apply the instructions to the relevant facts of the case and would 
be much more effective than requiring jurors to try, over long 
hours of testimony, to determine how a particular instruction is 
relevant. 
Judge George R. Triplett of Elkins, West Virginia, has sug- 
gested four stages of a trial a t  which continuing instructions 
might be introduced to aid the jury: orientation instructions prior 
to the voir dire examination; admonitions, descriptions, and defi- 
nitions prior to opening arguments; admonitions at  each recess 
and adjournment; and the final charge a t  the close of the trial.63 
Not all types of instructions would be appropriate for prelim- 
inary or continuing instructions. For example, no instruction that 
pertains to evidence not yet presented in the case should be given 
by way of preliminary or continuing i n s t r u c t i ~ n . ~ ~  However, most 
jurists and commentators recognize that cautionary instructions, 
61. Geller, Experience and Reflections of a Trial Judge, 21 N.Y. COUNTY A.B. BULL. 
118 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Geller] . 
62. See Richards, Preliminary Jury Instructions, 11 JUDGES' J. 33 (1972). 
63. Triplett, Meaningful Jury Instructions at Various Stages of Trial, 13 JUDGES' J.
37 (1974) [hereinafter cited as niplett]. See also Geller, supra note 61, at 118; McKenzie, 
The Judge-A Mere Referee?, 6 TRIAL JUDGES' J. 4 (1967) [hereinafter cited as McKen- 
zie]. 
64. See Triplett, supra note 63, at 38. 
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matters concerning witness credibility, and definitions of terms 
are proper subjects of instruction to the jury before evidence is 
heardF Similarly, when evidence is admitted for a limited pur- 
pose, the judge should make that fact clear to the jury then and 
not wait until the final charge to do so.' Also, many confusing 
trial procedures such as the use of the hypothetical question or 
the functions of depositions and interrogatories, should be ex- 
plained at  the time they are introduced." Such explanations 
would definitely help jurors to understand trial procedures and 
legal terms and concepts-three areas of much juror confusion. 
C.  Juror Orientation 
1. The problem of confusion over trial procedures 
Closely allied to the need for improving the substance of jury 
instructions is the need to provide juror orientation. Much of the 
confusion which can be alleviated by improved instructions may 
be further clarified by providing good quality juror orientation. 
Inadequate orientation often leads to misunderstandings regard- 
ing trial  procedure^,^^ frustration over trial delays," and confusion 
when jurors are confronted with the legalese used throughout the 
trial and in the jury  instruction^.^^ These three sources of confu- 
sion and frustration can be dealt with by adopting the philosophy 
that the first requirement for a quality jury trial is meaningful 
juror orientation. 
The need for orientation is generally well accepted, as indi- 
cated by the following statement from The State Trial Judges' 
Book recognizing the value of jury orientation: 
[The judge] should . . . be alert to ways in which the jury can 
be made a more effective instrument in the administration of 
justice. 
. . . . 
. . . The trial judge should remember that jurors come to 
court without preparation, without orientation, without knowl- 
edge of law or its procedures, unfamiliar with court atmosphere, 
65. See Musser, Instructing the Jury-Pattern Instructions, 9 AM. JUR. TRIALS 923, 
939-40 (1967). 
66. Id. 
67. See McKenzie, supra note 63, at 5. 
68. Forston (1973), supra note 10, at 18; Forston (1968), supra note 7, at 67. 
69. See Connelly, Jury Duty-The Juror's View, 55 JUDICATURE 118 (1971); Irate 
Woman Says Jurors Herded Like Animals, Des Moines Tribune, April 15, 1974, at 2, col. 
1; The Jilted Jurors, Wall Street J., Dec. 14, 1972, at 16, col. 1. 
70. See note 10 supra. 
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demeanor or decorum, and unacquainted with the precise man- 
ner of their selection or the specific purpose of this intrusion 
upon their time. 
. . . .  
. . . He [the judge] should attempt to enrich the 
knowledge of jurors, to the end that they will better understand 
the system and workings of our courts and will be prepared to 
assume and discharge . . . the important duties assigned to 
them." 
2. Survey research: The Pre-Service Juror Orientation Project 
In the autumn of 1974, a Pre-Service Juror Orientation Pro- 
ject was conducted which utilized a stratified random sampling 
questionnaire to survey the use of various jury orientation train- 
ing  procedure^.'^ The random stratified sampling covered large 
and small districts in every state of the country. Of the 250 
questionnaires mailed, 156 were completed and returned. This 
data permitted analysis of 131 different judicial districts repre- 
senting all fifty states. Notably, all districts reported that jurors 
received some kind of orientation training. Table 3 shows which 
of five kinds of training-letters, oral remarks, handbooks, film, 
instructions-are most frequently given. 
TABLE 3 
Types of Juror Orientation Training and Percentage of Use 
Orientation Letter 




Number of Per Cent of 
Districts Total 
The following is a brief discussion of four commonly used 
orientation tools:73 
a. Letters. Although many jurors receive a personal letter 
notifying them of their call to jury duty, only 3 percent of such 
71. THE STATE TRIAL JUDGES' BOOK, supra note 14, a t  98-99. See also Helwig, The 
American Jury System: A Time For Reexamination, 55 JUDICATURE 96, 99 (1971); 
O'Connor, The Right to Trial by an Ignorant Jury, 3 TRIAL JUDGES' J .  3, 6 (1964); Those 
Erroneous Images, Salt Lake Tribune, March 16, 1975, !j A, a t  16, col. 1. 
72. This project was funded by the Drake.University Research Council (1974). 
73. Discussion of the fifth type of orientation training covered by the Pre-Service 
Juror Orientation Project survey, jury instructions, has been omitted because of the exten- 
sive discussion of this topic elsewhere in the article. 
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letters serve an orientation function. Some of the reported orien- 
tation letters are too vague to be classified as meaningful train- 
ing. 
b. Oral orientation. The large majority of judges present 
some pre-service message to jurors which they call training. The 
length (see Table 4) and quality of these messages vary consider- 
ably. 
TABLE 4 
Length and Percentage of Total Judges' Oral Presentation: 
Orientation Training of Jurors 
Time in 
Minutes 






Number of Per Cent of 
Districts Total 
Total 131 100.0 
In analyzing the quality of sample oral presentations, the 
Pre-Service Juror Orientation Project found that much of the 
time is spent presenting three kinds of information: 
(1) The historical background of the jury system and its 
purpose, often beginning with the thirteenth century and pro- 
ceeding to the present. 
(2) Patriotic messages about the duty of all eligible citizens 
to serve their country, delivered as persuasive appeals to keep 
jurors from asking to be excused from jury service. 
(3) Information regarding administrative matters, such as 
fees, telephoning, and parking, eating, and restroom facilities. 
Those who believe that the above kinds of information con- 
stitute true orientation are self-deceived. In fact, the main pur- 
pose such remarks serve is the social function of welcoming the 
jurors. Such remarks are also intended to serve a persuasive func- 
tion in that they attempt to deter as many jurors as possible from 
asking to be excused from jury duty. In practice, very little of 
such initial oral orientation provides meaningful information 
which will help jurors to better understand the various stages of 
a trial, legal terminology, or jury room deliberation  procedure^.^^ 
74. Interviews and discussions conducted by the author at the National College of the 
State Judiciary, Reno, Nevada, July 28-Aug. 2, 1974, at the Kansas Pattern Jury Instruc- 
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A judge could spend his oral orientation time more 
meaningfully by assigning a jury commissioner the responsibility 
of announcing and explaining administrative details, as well as 
giving information about the importance of jury service and how 
jurors are called for duty. If patriotic and historical messages are 
kept brief, a judge could spend much more of his time helping 
jurors become acquainted with their role and trial procedures. 
Another simple means of improving oral orientation sessions 
would be to extend them to include the giving of certain instruc- 
tions which would apply to any case, such as the meaning of 
evidence, burden of proof, and the function of the jury.75 
c. Handbooks. Both the National Conference of Rural Jus- 
tice and the American Bar Association's Project on Standards for 
Criminal Justice take the position that juror orientation is desira- 
ble and that tightly drawn juror handbooks are preferred to ex- 
temporaneous oral  instruction^.^^ Perhaps reflective of this posi- 
tion is the fact that almost two-thirds of all judicial districts use 
a juror's handbook in their training procedures (see Table 3). 
These booklets vary considerably as to content, but the majority 
cover a t  least the following subjects: the importance of jury ser- 
vice, the jury panel selection process, the history of the jury 
system, the types of cases (civil and criminal), the stages of a 
trial, and expected jury behavior. Many manuals also include a 
juror's creed or oath, definitions of some legal terms, and general 
information about juror compensation. 
But handbooks, to be of any value, must be read by jurors, 
and some doubt exists as to the extent to which handbooks are 
in fact studied. The author found as part of a survey that less 
than 10 percent of the jurors had read any portion of the juror's 
manual after one week of service.77 However, evidence exists 
which indicates that if handbooks are mailed to jurors prior to 
service, and if jurors are strongly encouraged by letter to read the 
manuals, the percentage of handbooks read increases to 75 per- 
cent or more.78 
d .  Films. As Table 3, above, illustrates, orientation films 
tions Committee Meeting, Oct. 14-15, 1974, and at the American Academy of Judicial 
Education Conference, Des Moines, Iowa, Dec. 4-6, 1974; WOLESLAGEL (1972), supra note 
34, at 48. 
75. See O'Reilly, supra note 10, at 69. 
76. ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 327 (1974); 
Standards Relating to Trial by Jury (ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal 
Justice) 86 (1968); Woleslagel (1974), supra note 10. 
77. Forston (1973), supra note 10, at 69. 
78. See Woleslagel (1974), supra note 10. 
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are one of the least frequently utilized orientation tools. The Pre- 
Service Orientation Project found that less than 7 percent of all 
judicial districts utilize training films. 
The content of the four films used by the responding districts 
vary in their specificity and in their attempts to illuminate the 
complex trial process and abstract legal language. The quality of 
films available is called into question by the fact that almost 20 
percent of the trial judges who responded to the questionnaire 
volunteered, without the use of prompting questions, that they 
were dissatisfied with existing training films. In general, the 
judges complained that the films were either outdated or far too 
general. Since the above information was volunteered and not 
specifically requested, general dissatisfaction with existing train- 
ing films is probably far more substantial than might be indi- 
cated by the 20 percent of respondents who mentioned this prob- 
lem. 
3. Improving juror orientation 
The issue today is not whether to provide juror orienta- 
tion-providing such training is universally recognized as being 
desirable. The crucial issue is what quality of orientation should 
be provided. At present, the quality of orientation training pro- 
vided nationally is generally not high and should be improved. 
The following are two suggested ways by which significant im- 
provements in orientation quality might be obtained. 
First, there is a need to coordinate the various training proce- 
dures into a single orientation program designed to help jurors 
better understand and perform their function. One innovative 
way to accomplish this would be to produce an orientation film 
designed to be used in conjunction with a thorough, but readable, 
juror handbook. Such a film should contain excerpts from trials 
designed to show the jurors what to expect during the trial. The 
handbook should teach the jurors about trial procedure, stages of 
the trial, legal vocabulary, and other confusing items that they 
will surely encounter. Both the handbook and the film could be 
tested to determine the extent to which they successfully instruct 
laymen in general trial procedure and legal concepts. The hand- 
book, along with an orientation letter, should be mailed ten days 
to two weeks in advance of the day a juror first reports for duty 
in order to encourage prior study of the book. Additionally, the 
judge, in his pre-service oral remarks, should stress the impor- 
tance of becoming familiar with the material in the book. 
Another training method which might prove to be worth de- 
veloping for jurors who must spend long periods waiting, would 
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be a series of compact listening comprehension training sessions. 
These materials can be specifically designed to improve the ju- 
rors' ability to listen and understand information presented in 
trial settings. A program of this type could consist of a series of 
brief cassette tapes played to the jury when time permits. A pilot 
study which the author conducted indicated the potential such a 
program promises for improving juror comprehension. In that 
study, a short listening comprehension course (with no special 
emphasis on legal materials) improved the comprehension of jury 
instructions by 15 percent .7g 
If courts will be innovative enough to implement practices 
such as those suggested, they will soon find they have jurors with 
a much better understanding of the legal process and who are 
better able to intelligently perform their function. 
D. Two- Way Communication 
1.  The problem of "linear-one- way " communication 
Empirical study has revealed a fourth area of weakness in the 
jury system-a failure to achieve two-way communication. Much 
of the confusion in the jury room results from the fact that jurors 
are not allowed to ask clarifying questions, either as to matters 
of evidence or as to points of law. And, as the studies have further 
indicated, once the jurors are in the deliberating room they are 
extremely reluctant to send a question to the judge. The result is 
that the jurors make their decision without having their questions 
answered-without having all the information they feel is impor- 
tant.80 
Acknowledging the validity of these findings, it is clear that 
jury trials, as traditionally conducted, are classic examples of a 
"linear-one-way" communication process. The linear-one-way 
communication process occurs when person A transmits a mes- 
sage to person B without allowing B to respond to A. A wealth of 
empirical, theoretical, and practical evidence shows that in such 
communicative situations messages invariably become dis- 
torted? Distortion occurs principally through leveling, sharpen- 
79. Forston (1973), supra note 10, at 69. 
80. See text accompanying note 19 supra. 
81. See, e.g., G. ALLPORT & L. POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR (1947); D. BARN- 
LUND, INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION: SURVEY AND STUDIES 229 (1968); F. BARTLEIT, 
REMEMBERING (1932); D. BERLO, THE PROCESS OF COMMUNICATION 111 (1960); J. KELTNER, 
INTERPERSONAL SPEECH-COMMUNICATION 84 (1970); K.  SERENO & C. MORTENSEN, FOUNDA- 
TIONS OF COMMUNICATION HEORY (1970); Carmichael, Hogan & Walter, An Experimental 
Study of the Effect of Language on the Reproduction of Visually Perceived Form, 15 J .  
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ing, assimilation, and secondarily, through exaggeration, conden- 
sation, and conventi~nalization.~ As messages become longer and 
more complex under one-way communication, the communica- 
tion is received less accurately and with more frustration and 
hostility. 
Two-way communication or circular response, on the other 
hand, incorporates the crucially important component of "feed- 
back."% Feedback encourages the sender to rectify unclear mes- 
sages and to supply missing information without which the com- 
munication may be incomplete or confusing. Experiments have 
demonstrated with consistency that the accuracy of information 
transferred by two-way communication far exceeds the accuracy 
of information passed by one-way communication. Moreover, 
two-way communication increases both sender and receiver con- 
fidence, generates less frustration, and promotes more willingness 
to decide and act on the basis of i n f o r m a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
The findings of two-way communication research have im- 
portant implications for traditional jury trial procedures. One 
expert, who has done research in this area, discusses three impli- 
cations: 
1. However clear a witness or lawyer may be in his own 
mind about the information he seeks to communicate to the 
jury, i t  follows from the very nature of one-way communication 
that except in the case of very simple messages the information 
as received is bound to be distorted; 
2. Gaps or omissions in the evidence, even though highly 
relevant to a proper determination of the issues, cannot be reme- 
died under conditions of one-way communication; and 
3. The jury's seeming lack of power to seek corrective or 
EXP. PSYCH. 73 (1932); Gibson, The Reproduction of Visually Perceived Forms, 12 J. EXP. 
PSYCH. 1 (1929); Leavitt & Mueller, Some Effects of Feedback on Communication, 4 
HUMAN RELATIONS 401 (1951); Powers, Clark & McFarland, A General Feedback Theory 
of Human Behavior, 11 PERCEP~UAL AND MOTOR SKILLS 71 (1960); Stolz & Tannenbaum, 
Effects of Feedback on Oral Encoding Behavior, 6 LANG. AND SPEECH 218 (1963); Tustin, 
Feedback, 187 SCI. AM. 48 (1952). 
82. Leveling is a process of systematically omitting details of the communication 
which do not conform to the stereotypes about the persons sending the message. 
Sharpening stresses the details that remain in the familiar pattern, and is partly a result 
of the leveling process; since fewer details remain, those left are more prominent. 
Assimilation adapts the message to the most available frames of reference. Condensation 
reduces the message to a few easily remembered details. Conventionalization removes 
unfamiliar elements from the message, such as strange words, subtle shadings of meaning, 
and so on. 
83. See Haney, A Comparative Study of Unilateral and Bilateral Communication, 7 
ACA. OF MANAGEMENT J. 128 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Haney]. 
84. Edises, supra note 14, a t  78; Haney, supra note 83, at  132. 
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supplementary information encourages speculation about mat- 
ters which are without adequate factual basis or otherwise inap- 
propriate for jury consideration. Questioning by the jurors dur- 
ing the course of the trial would tend to pinpoint such areas of 
improper speculation and enable the trial judge to neutralize 
the effects by appropriate adm~n i t i on .~~  
Thus, if the function of the jury is truly a fact-finding one, the 
jury should have the right to question witnesses, attorneys, and 
the judge regarding issues in the case. Similarly, if the jury is 
expected to apply the law with any degree of intelligence, it 
should have the right to ask questions of the judge to ascertain 
the meaning of the law it is trying to apply. Only through such 
two-way communication can this essential information be accu- 
rately transferred from the trial participants to the jurors. 
2. Appropriateness of two-way communication in jury trials 
While some courts do encourage questioning by jurors,86 more 
frequently courts criticize the practice." One objection raised in 
opposition to allowing questions by jurors is that two-way com- 
munication will lengthen trials and thus further retard the func- 
tioning of our overburdened trial courts. While it is true that two- 
way communication tends to take more time, the additional time 
typically should be minimal. If the questioning takes more time, 
it may well be the result of a complex or poorly presented case. 
On the other hand, clarifications of proof, and the consequent 
enlightenment of the jurors resulting from feedback, will proba- 
bly shorten the deliberation period. As discussed previously, 
much needless deliberation time is caused by the confusion and 
ambiguity inherent in one-way communication.88 Accordingly, 
the result of allowing juror questions might in fact prove to be 
shorter and more accurate, rather than longer, trials. 
The primary reservation about permitting juror questions, 
however, is that such questions might interfere with the orderly 
conduct of the trial. This concern is an important criticism and 
is regarded as valid by both friend and foe of the practice. The 
problem is that since jurors are not trained in the law, there is a 
great likelihood that they will ask improper questions. This prob- 
- 
85. Edises, supra note 14. See also Hacker, supra note 14. 
86. Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 872,878 and cases cited at 879 (1970). It is interesting to note 
that in English courts jurors are permitted to ask questions throughout the course of the 
trial. See Hacker, supra note 14, at 55. Moreover, coroner's juries in the United States 
are allowed to pose questions. See Edises, supra note 14, a t  79. 
87. Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 872, 880 and cases cited at 881 (1970). 
88. See text accompanying note 20 supra. 
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lem is compounded by the fact that attorneys are reluctant to 
object to questions by jurors for fear of prejudicing the jury 
against their case. 
These potential problems need not necessarily create chaos. 
Modifications of the rules can be devised which will enable jurors 
to pose their questions in an orderly manner. An example of such 
possible modification is incorporated in the following recommen- 
dation : 
The jurors can be told at  the commencement of the trial that 
they have the right to propound questions to each witness just 
before his dismissal from the stand. The requirement that ques- 
tions be in writing and handed to the judge will tend to avoid 
possible indiscretions by the questioning juror. The judge can 
rule on the propriety of the questions and, if necessary, rephrase 
them to meet evidentiary requirements. Objections by counsel 
can be dealt with privately by summoning the attorneys to the 
bench or to chambers, thus preventing an objecting lawyer from 
being put 'on the spot' with the juror who proposed the question. 
Requests to counsel for clarification or amplification of evidence 
can likewise be screened for appropriateness by the trial judge.89 
Judge Robert Jones of Portland, Oregon, reports that for 
more than fifteen years he has followed procedures similar to 
those outlined above. He indicates that jurors' questions serve a 
valuable function as immediate feedback to the lawyers and to 
himself, as the judge, regarding how clearly the case is being 
presented?O Similarly, Judge Frederick Woleslagel of Lyons, 
Kansas, occasionally invites the trial attorneys to present perti- 
nent juror questions and follow-up questions to the appropriate 
witnes~es.~' In light of communication theory and research, i t  
seems clear that other courts should follow the lead of judges such 
as these. 
E. Note-Taking 
1 .  The problem of recall 
A fifth means of lessening juror confusion is to allow jurors 
to take notes during the delivery of trial testimony. Note-taking 
has much to offer as a means of improving communication, for 
only through some type of written record can a juror be expected 
89. Edises, supra note 14, at 79. 
90. R. Jones, "Judge-Jury Relations" Course at the National College of the State 
Judiciary, Reno, Nevada (June 23-July 5, 1974). 
91. Woleslagel (1974), supra note 10. 
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to remember in any detail all the testimony presented in the 
course of a lengthy or complex case.g2 One commentator described 
the situation this way: 
Jurors are not allowed to take notes. This rule prevails no 
matter how long the trial, or complicated the testimony, or am- 
biguous the law. Our case was relatively short, but it still added 
up to forty hours of unrelieved listening, the equivalent of a 
semester's worth of lectures. Imagine not taking a single note 
during a college course and then being expected to do justice to 
a final exam.93 
2. Appropriateness of note-taking to jury trials 
Despite the existence of the above described situation, 
numerous objections have been raised against allowing note- 
taking by jurors. Some argue i t  would give undue advantage to 
the literate over the illiterate, or to the person who takes copious 
notes over the person who doodles. The answer to that objection 
is that the present system gives advantage to the person who 
purports to have the better memory, or who has the more domi- 
neering personality-under no system would all jurors have equal 
influence. Other critics argue that jurors would miss parts of the 
testimony while involved in the act of writing; but this seems less 
serious than the danger that a juror will simply forget even 
greater amounts of testimony under the present practice because 
he is not allowed to make a written reminder for himself. 
Some safeguards on note-taking are of course desirable be- 
cause there concededly are dangers involved. Judge Elvin J. 
Brown of Norman, Oklahoma, suggests three worthwhile precau- 
tions which should be observed: 
First, all jurors should have equal opportunity although 
none should be required to take notes against their will. The 
trial judge should be prepared to distribute pencil and pad to 
each juror to guarantee equality of opportunity, even though 
some may only use them on which to doodle. 
Second, jurors should be assured of the confidentiality of 
their notes. The subject matter of their notes should only be 
92. An historical survey of juror note taking and a detailed discussion of the argu- 
ments pro and con are beyond the scope of this paper. For a general discussion of this 
topic, see Buzard, Jury Note-Taking in Criminal Trials, 42 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 490 
(1951); Petroff, The Practice of Jury Note Taking-Misconduct, Right or Privilege?, 18 
OKLA. L. REV. 125 (1965); Comment, More About Jurors and Note Taking, 103 BAR BULL. 
OF BOSTON 6 (1935); 11 S. CAR. L.Q. 397 (1959); 34 TEX. L. REV. 1100 (1956); Note, The 
Roblem of Note-Taking by Jurors, 18 U. Prrr. L. REV. 800 (1957). 
93. Hacker, supra note 14, at 55. 
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revealed in the privacy of the deliberations of the jury, and only 
then when the juror with notes elects to disclose them. 
Third, the jurors should be admonished to be as tolerant of 
the notes of another as they should be of another's independent 
recollection of the proceedings. After all, there's no magic in 
note taking. The percentage of reversible error in cases tried by 
a judge will probably run about the same for the cases in which 
he takes notes as those in which he doesn't.v4 
While the vast majority of federal and state jurisdictions 
allow trial judges to permit jurors to take notes, few judges have 
exercised this dis~retion?~ If jurors are expected to remember and 
consider all the relevant facts in deliberation, steps should be 
taken to reverse this situation. 
F. Juror Selection 
The final suggestion for improving the jury system lies in the 
area of juror selection. Ordinarily the criteria by which certain 
jurors are selected and others are excluded from service are not 
regarded as part of the communication process. However, the 
personal abilities and qualifications that a listener brings to a 
communication process have a great influence on the quality of 
the communication. This phenomenon was illustrated by the fact 
that the well-educated jurors in one study described above scored 
much higher on the jury instruction comprehension tests than did 
the broader sample of j u r ~ r s . ~ V h i l e  it may be contended that 
the college student jurors were simply better at taking tests, an 
equally valid inference is that well-educated jurors understand 
legal concepts better and are able to apply them more intelli- 
gently. 
1. The problem of juror selection 
a. Exemption from jury service. Two prime factors affect 
the demographic characteristics of citizens who serve on juries. 
The first is exemption from jury service. Over the years jury trials 
have become increasingly longer. Also, jury terms are fairly long, 
averaging between two and four weeks, with some rural areas 
requiring jurors to be on call for three months or longer. Due to 
the time commitment involved, the vast majority of citizens 
94. Brown, Note Taking by Jurors, 10 JUDGES' J .  27 (1971). 
95. Id. 
96. See Table 2, supra. See also Broeder, Occupational Expertise and Bias as Affect- 
ing Juror Behavior: A Preliminary Look, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1079 (1965); James, supra note 
3, at 565. 
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initially contacted for jury service ask to be excused for personal 
or work hardships, and most of these requests are honored. Those 
excused include large numbers of managerial, executive, and pro- 
fessional people, and those with higher incomes and college edu- 
cat ion~.~'  Moreover, each state has an exemption statute which 
officially excuses dozens of occupational ca tegor ie~.~~ Hence, the 
elderly, unemployed, and mature housewives with grown children 
dominate the basic jury pool. 
b. Exclusion by voir dire. The second factor with affects 
jury make-up is the selection process exercised during the voir 
dire examination. One study found that voir dire screening elimi- 
nates a large proportion of the following classes of jurors: Roman 
Catholics; managerial, executive, and professional people; per- 
sons in the highest paid and the most prestigious job categories; 
and those with college degrees.9g Thus, legal rules, instead of 
being shaped to ameliorate the effects of the jury's weaknesses, 
seem to have been almost purposefully designed to augment 
them.loO As described above, the typical jury selection process 
provides an excellent example of the steps the law has taken to 
impede the jury's successful performance of its fact-finding func- 
tion. As one critic has said: 
The body of law governing the selection of jurors, rather 
than recognizing and attempting to reduce the affects of the 
juror's inexperience in handling legal matters, has instead ex- 
empted from service many of the groups who might best be 
expected to overcome this handicap.lol 
We must be certain that those who find facts as jurors have 
the capacity to think, to understand problems, and to apply the 
law. Systematic exemption of those citizens who may have the 
97. See Douty, How People Stay Off Juries, POTOMAC, Jan. 28, 1968, a t  20-22, 26-27. 
98. The Illinois exemption statute is thypical: 
The following persons shall be exempt from serving as jurors, to-wit: The 
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, State Comptroller, Treas- 
urer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Attorney General, members of the 
General Assembly during their term of office, all judges of courts, all clerks of 
courts, sheriffs, coroners, practicing physicians, Christian Science practitioners, 
Christian Science readers, postmasters, practicing attorneys, all officers of the 
United States, officiating ministers of the gospel, members of religious com- 
munities, mayors of cities, policemen, active members of the Fire Department 
and all persons actively employed upon the editorial or mechanical staffs and 
departments of any newspaper of general circulation printed and published in 
this state. 
REV. STAT. ch. 78, 0 4 (Supp. 1973). 
99. Padawer-Singer, supra note 12, at 388. 
100. Broeder, The Function of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386, 
:1954) [hereinafter cited as Broeder] . 
101. Id. 
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best credentials is disgraceful and perhaps an unconstitutional 
denial of the right to trial by a jury of one's peers.lo2 
2. Improving the juror selection process 
a. Encouraging service. Procedures could easily be devel- 
oped to help make the jury pool a more accurate cross-section of 
the community. The basic philosophy that needs to be followed 
is that of doing as much as is reasonably feasible to facilitate a 
juror's performance of his duty. Economic conditions and other 
annoying frustrations must not be allowed to keep citizens from 
being willing to serve. 
Shorter required jury terms are a prerequisite of implement- 
ing such a philosophy. A short two-week term would encourage 
service by many who now ask to be excused. In the same vein, 
too many judges and jury commissioners make jury service an 
either-or proposition: either you serve now or you are excused. 
Other viable options exist. For example, a prospective juror could 
have his service postponed to a more convenient time. Or a list 
of dates might be made available from which a citizen could 
select the most convenient time for him to serve. In the case of 
special hardships, where even two weeks may be too long, a juror 
might be asked to serve on one case, or for a few days, or for one 
week, and then be excused for the remainder of the term. 
A second means of lessening the unfavorable impact of jury 
service would be to provide jurors with better facilities during 
their waiting periods. If businessmen and professionals had ac- 
cess to a telephone, typewriter, table, and dictating equipment, 
much of the hardship arising from jury service would be reduced. 
Some cities furnish jurors with free street parking or free parking 
in municipal lots. Thoughtfulness toward those who must serve 
certainly encourages jury service from more individuals and re- 
duces requests for early release from duty. 
Another reform which is needed is the payment of juror fees 
which are more commensurate with the financial sacrifices in- 
curred by jurors. A higher fee structure is essential in order to 
obtain a more accurate cross-section of the community on jury 
panels. lo3 
b. The voir dire screening process. The fact that capable 
102. See C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 78 (1962); Winick, The Psychology of 
Juries, LEGAL AND CRIMINAL PSYCH. 96 (H. Toch ed. 1961). 
103. ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 327 
(1974); Standards Relating to Trial by Jury (ABA Project on Minimum Standards for 
Criminal Justice) 89 (1968). 
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jurors are screened out during voir dire examination is not as 
easily corrected. It will be necessary for trial attorneys and judges 
to recognize and deal with the inconsistency of criticising the jury 
for its inability to understand and evaluate facts and the law, 
while a t  the same time dismissing those potential jurors who are 
the most qualified. 
I t  has been said that  the least informed jurors are often 
sought by those whose cases are weak and who wish to pull the 
wool over uninformed eyedo4 It has also been argued that the 
most capable jurors are likely to have too much influence with 
other jurors and, therefore, should be challenged. lo5 But as men- 
tioned above, influence is relative; every jury has those who are 
most influential. Nothing can insure a group of jurors with equal 
influence among themselves.106 If an attorney and his client are 
seeking a fair jury, they will probably desire that the most, rather 
than the least, informed individuals participate as jurors.lo7 
A case for judge-conducted voir dire may be made based on 
the hypothesis that it would, to some limited extent, reduce the 
screening out of the more qualified citizens as jurors. Even if such 
a change were made, however, lawyers could still affect the com- 
position of a jury through their use of peremptory challenges. The 
propriety of using peremptory challenges for the purpose of excus- 
ing those who are most experienced is a t  least questionable, if not 
unethical, and some believe these challenges should be abol- 
ished.lo8 Some reformers have recommended use of special or 
"blue ribbon" juries in order to obtain more jurors from upper 
socio-economic backgrounds than normally serve. log The "blue 
ribbon" method of selecting jurors was employed in federal jury 
trials until the latter part of the 1960's but is no longer permitted 
because of racial inequities.l1° Although such "blue ribbon" selec- 
tion techniques may not be allowed, the legal profession should 
not allow the jury selection process to be so distorted as to, in 
effect, prohibit our most capable citizens from contributing their 
abilities to the justice system. 
104. WOLESLAGEL (1972), supra note 34, at 58-60. 
105. Broeder, supra note 100, at 391. 
106. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 188 (1949). 
107. Forston (1968), supra note 7, at 81; Blade, Professor: Juries Often Decide Early, 
Minneapolis Star, July 29, 1967, § A at 9. 
108. Broeder, supra note 100 at 391. 
109. See, e.g., Baker, In Defense of the "Blue RibbonJ' Jury, 35 IOWA L. REV. 409 
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JURY TRIAL COMMUNICATION 
This article has attempted to demonstrate that problems of 
communication are present in the jury system and are severely 
impairing the functioning of jurors. In addition, certain possible 
solutions to those problems were suggested. Yet, while this review 
of communication problems and possible solutions may encour- 
age some judges to experiment with the ideas presented, others 
will demand more conclusive empirical evidence on the effects 
that the proposed communication procedures will have on jury 
deliberations and final verdicts. Such requests are valid; unfor- 
tunately, little data has been assembled. Therefore, perhaps the 
most important function this article can serve is to help the legal 
profession recognize that the issues discussed herein are vital 
enough to warrant major attention by researchers and funding 
agencies. 
Even though problems are present in the jury system, they 
can be largely resolved by changing the conditions under which 
jurors must labor. These changes will occur if trial courts are 
willing to try new ideas, if appellate courts are willing to support 
trial courts in their controlled experiments with new communica- 
tion processes, and if funding is made available to support the 
proper administrative management of the changes and to empiri- 
cally evaluate their effects. 
